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Thinking and Talking About Acting:1 Re-Reading Sonia 
Moore's Training an Actor 
Phillip B. Zarrilli 
Introduction 
When we think about and talk about acting, we usually do not examine 
either our language or the assumptions that lie behind it. In raising the same 
issue for historians of the theatre as I raise for performers, Bruce A. 
McConachie locates "the source of the problem [ . . . in] a frequent human 
failing: the tendency to believe that the mode of perception common to the 
majority is the best way to understand the world".2 In addition to McConachie, 
a number of scholars from a variety of disciplines have begun to question this 
typical non-reflexive, positivist way of thinking, talking, and writing. 
Anthropologist James Clifford recently asserted that all narratives [including 
those about performance], are "constructed, artificial [... ] cultural accounts"3 
which are not representations of a truth or a reality, but rather are inventions 
of culture in Roy Wagner's sense.4 Edwin Bruner said the same thing in a 
slightly different way-that all texts are formed around implicit stories 
constructed according to who receives the narrative.5 If we accept the premise 
that all narratives are inventions, it means that each narrative is located within 
a particular historical, socio-cultural context, i.e., each narrative has one or 
more implicit stories that were written for particular audiences in particular 
contexts. 
Many narratives are written by authors who assume that what they are 
constructing is a truth and/or the "best" version of a particular reality. Most 
narratives foreground neither the process of constructing this version of "the 
truth," or the voice with which this version was constructed. To do so would 
reveal the fact that this version is simply one particular version situated 
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in space and time, and authored by a particular person. Therefore, implicit 
stories, assumed by an author when writing a narrative, usually remain hidden. 
This view recognizes the importance, even urgency, of re-viewing the narratives 
of all disciplines-including performance practice and scholarship--and of 
articulating their hitherto implicit stories. 
To that end, this essay is a close re-reading of one narrative about acting, 
written to illuminate the implicit stories that one author assumes, but never 
foregrounds.6 I have chosen to re-read Sonia Moore's Training an Actor: The 
Stanislavski System in Class.7 I have selected Moore's work, not because it is 
either remarkable or a book I would recommend to a student of acting, but 
rather because Moore's version of American method acting is suffused with 
those most commonplace modernist, positivist assumptions which inform how 
we often think and talk about acting, and which in a postmodern world have 
become problematic.8 
Before discussing Moore's text, I want to foreground my own point of 
view. As a teacher of actors I have long been troubled by the confusion 
students in a university setting exhibit over the relationship between them-
selves and what they do (acting). In contrast, and for many reasons I cannot 
detail in this brief essay, when talking to performers trained in traditional 
disciplines in Asia, I have never encountered this same confusion. The rather 
obvious idea long ago dawned on me that one reason for the difference is that 
traditional Asian performers have very different enculturated ways of thinking 
and talking about the experience of performance which do not raise the 
primarily psychological and identity issues or confusions implicit in how we 
usually think and talk about performance. For one thing, Asian notions of the 
"self* are quite different from our common Western ones; therefore, Asian 
notions about the relationship of "self' to role, character, and acting are also 
quite different.9 
It is important to know that I also have a vested interest in clarifying my 
students' confusion. Since I use non-Western performance techniques to teach 
Western actors, I question whether the positivist, psychologically-based notions 
of self, behavior, experience, role, and character assumed by most students of 
acting are clear and adequate paradigms for understanding performance as an 
embodied, psychophysical activity. Consequently, I am in the process of 
articulating an alternative paradigm of acting which may better delineate the 
relationship between self, behavior, experience, role, and character; may better 
fit a postpositivist approach to acting; and better fit the contemporary 
American performer's experience of what they do and how they do it. This 
rereading of Moore is a preliminary step in this direction.10 
Re-Reading Sonia Moorefs Training an Actor: Four Legitimizing Discourses 
In her foreword Moore states her purpose: "to demonstrate how an actor 
is trained" in the "Stanislavski System".11 She asserts that "the System should 
Spring 1989 39 
be the required training for all actors" (13), and wishes to demonstrate "the 
fact... that there is no other method of acting but Stanislavski's" [italics mine] 
(14). The book consists of twenty-four chapters prepared from tape-recordings 
"made during Sonia Moore's classes at her Studio in New York City," (27) a 
foreword by Sonia Moore, and five appendices including selections from The 
Three Sisters, notes on scenes used in the classes, notes for a character 
biography, a brief Stanislavski chronology, and a selection of suggested 
exercises. But neither in the foreword nor body of the text does the author 
inform us about either the specific period during which the tapes were made 
or the process of editing. Nor is there specific information on the class 
environment, students, or instructor. The "truths" of the edited transcripts are 
apparently assumed to be universal enough that such specific contextual 
information is deemed unnecessary. 
Moore uses four closely related discourses to legitimize her claims for the 
supremacy of her version of the Stanislavski System: (1) the professionalization 
of acting; (2) the necessity of systematizing the method of acting; (3) reification 
of Nature and her "natural laws" as the source of acting; and (4) the hegemony 
of the experimental, scientific method in discovering the truths of the essential 
nature of acting. First is the discourse of "professionalism." The implicit story 
is that of the actor. For Moore, "acting is a profession." (32) One goal in 
writing the book is to make up for the present "lack of professionalism" in the 
theatre by introducing a system (The System) which will "provide one 
professional language and the one criterion" [italics mine] necessary for 
establishing a consistent professional standard for the theatre. (25) 
The larger story of professionalism which informs Moore's rhetoric says 
that if you want to be a professional you must receive professional training 
which will give you professional credentials. Getting professional 
credentialization means working "on the . . . System is not all fun," and that 
there will be "tremendous demands" imposed on performers. (32)12 Therefore, 
if you want to "become professional actors . . . this is the only way." (32) 
Moore's rhetoric of professionalization may be read as an extended 
apology for acting-a profession which has often been considered marginal and 
suspect. It lends an aura of legitimacy to acting, and at least rhetorically if not 
actually makes it equivalent to other acceptable professions like law, medicine, 
teaching, etc. 
As a "system" or "technique" of professional training, The Stanislavski 
System takes on the trappings of other professional training programs-first of 
all, it must be systematized. A systems rhetoric is Moore's second legitimizing 
discourse. If something is represented as systematic, it gathers to itself the 
authority and power of [at least apparent] logical organization. It is an 
authorizing and legitimizing language that makes what is done appear 
comprehensive and thorough—a system is, after all, all-encompassing. 
If acting is to be professionalized, then like other professions there must 
be a method of preparing the would-be professional. Moore asserts that 
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Stanislavski established the System once and for all precisely for this 
preparation. Moore's use of the capitalized System to represent this particular 
mode of transmission of performance skills reifies it and makes it appear to be 
the one and only acceptable mode of acting, and the one and only legitimate 
version of Stanislavski.13 
Does Moore's use of a systems rhetoric really tell us anything unusual 
about this mode of training? The following should be obvious to the reader, 
but is not obvious since it is not made explicit in the narrative: all modes of 
transmitting knowledge are systematic, i.e., orderly means of imparting [for the 
teacher] and actualizing [for the student]. Although some systems of training 
may appear dis-orderly to the outsider, each may be said to be ordered by the 
culturally constructed framework of expectations, assumptions, and activities 
which collectively constitute the activity being transmitted/learned. Is Moore's 
version of the Stanislavski System any more systematic than any other mode 
of transmission, or does her systems rhetoric simply make it appear to be so?14 
Ultimately, to establish the legitimacy of The System, Moore appeals to 
the highest authority-unchanging, universal, natural law-Nature Herself. 
"That is why he said, There is no Stanislavski System, only the system of nature 
herself.'" (27) Nature and the System are equivalent. What is natural and 
organic constitute unchangeable truth for the actor. 
Nature [and its "natural laws"] is the third discourse which shapes Moore's 
text. She assumes that acting, like the natural physical world, is governed by 
laws. 
Having studied the laws that govern human nervous activity, 
Stanislavski gradually developed a System that permits an actor 
consciously to control his entire apparatus of experiencing and of 
incarnating. (34) 
Moore quotes Stanislavski as saying 
This method is based on laws of the organic nature of an actor, 
which I studied in practice. Its strength is in the fact that there is 
nothing in it which I 'invented' and nothing which I did not verify by 
applying it to my students and myself.' (26) 
Moore assumes (1) that these laws have lain dormant in human nature, 
awaiting discovery; and (2) that the only method of discovering truth and 
thereby establishing once and for all these laws is an experimental scientific 
method-her fourth discourse. Consequently, invention is equated with 
falsehood since it is not eternal, organic, and part of nature. To eschew 
human agency and invention further establishes unchanging Nature as the 
untainted source of Stanislavski's System. She assumes that the laws of nature 
were always in the actor, waiting to be discovered by Stanislavski. 
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Moore's assumption of the primacy of the scientific method as the method 
of discovering these eternal truths leads her to cast Stanislavski in the role of 
the scientific investigator as she tells [invents] the story of the revelation of 
The System. She represents him as studying human nature itself and thereby 
developing a progressive set of hypotheses in his laboratory, making discoveries 
which were verified along the way: 
The System progressed as Stanislavski learned more about the 
human being, and his greatest discovery, made at the end of his 
career, was the fact that we behave in life in a psychophysical way. 
This discovery became the basis of what he called 'the method of 
physical actions' and considered to be the result of his whole life's 
work and the heart of his System. (34) 
The inevitability of progress, of discovering the answer, is supported by an 
implicit faith in the process of scientific discovery-Stanislavski making his 
"greatest discovery . . . at the end of his career" as the curtain dramatically 
drops on his life. 
The metaphor of Stanislavski-as-scientific-discoverer lends the entire 
discourse further authority as the answer to the historical dilemma which, 
Moore asserts, has always confronted the actor-discovering the universal laws 
that rule theatre. Moore cites a host of "great men of letters" and actors who 
"tried to formulate [these] laws for dramatic creativity." Moore never questions 
whether the premises, acting problems, or specific style that this system was 
historically designed to address are or are not the same ones necessary for 
other performers to address. She simply asserts that the problem as she 
defines it is the eternal problem for all actors, which is now solved.15 
Of these laws of acting inherent in human nature, Moore concludes that 
only Stanislavski succeeded in reconciling the contradictions between 
the actor as creator and the actor as character, and he alone 
developed the concrete techniques by which an actor consciously 
transforms his psychological and physical behavior into those of the 
character and creates the unique life of a man in every role. (14) 
Her logic is intriguing: having established that there are universal laws, she 
admits "contradictions" [an impossibility were this a physical law] in acting, but 
glosses this fundamental problem as if Stanislavski has solved it once and for 
all. The problem has supposedly been solved by developing the System which 
"Stanislavski determined with astonishing precision" (15)-implying that the 
techniques of the System have the precision, weight and absoluteness of those 
used to conduct a physics experiment and establish a physical law. 
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Derived from natural law, The System as well as the biography of its 
discoverer, Stanislavski, are reified and essentialized. It is not one system or 
a system among many possibilities, but the answer for all time: 
since the System is based on natural laws of human behavior, it is 
the same for old and young actors, for classic and contemporary 
plays, for conventional and unconventional productions, for all 
nationalities and in all times. (32) 
The Stanislavski System creates life by following the laws of 
nature through which the human being functions in life; therefore it 
can never become dated. (27) 
The arguments of timelessness and universality garner to The System an aura 
of unassailablity. It implies that once one has this, then the actor's search is 
over-nothing else need be done. This valorization of the System gives 
authority to this particular version of what is natural. 
Moore's arguments clearly identify her thinking as sharing in the basic 
assumptions of modern positivist thought. McConachie summarizes three of 
positivist thought's basic assumptions which obviously have informed Moore's 
four legitimizing discourses: 
(1) The belief that only objective truths can be counted as 
knowledge; (2) The assumption that only facts, dispassionately 
observed, can provide the basis for significant truth; and (3) A 
commitment to a 'theory free,' inductive process of arranging the 
facts so that they yield objective explanation. (467) 
Moore's assumption of laws also disregards completely the historical 
context and intellectual environment within which these supposed truths were 
discovered by Stanislavski, and within which she constructs her own particular 
version of the System. The lack of any contextualizing discourse is a common 
way of masking the particular context within which anything is first invented. 
Such masking hides all available alternatives. It creates the impression that 
this version is the only version. 
Not only does the assumption of laws and their subsequent reification 
leave us with little sense of the creative process through which Stanislavski 
might have made discoveries which she interprets as eternal laws, representing 
these discoveries as laws creates a closed system, and confuses the question of 
how they might take on meaning for the actor. It may seem axiomatic, but 
even if there were eternal laws, and even if we agreed that the use of "law" 
were an apt category with which to describe some aspect of the acting process, 
cognitively knowing a law of acting is quite different from the process of 
corporeal actualization. 
Spring 1989 43 
A Problematic Paradigm of Acting 
Although Moore never explicitly defines what she means by acting, her 
operative paradigm focuses almost exclusively on the self-conscious process of 
constructing the role or character an actor is to play, rather than on the 
phenomenon of en-acting that role. For Moore, creating a role involves 
determining the psychological and physical behavior of the character so that 
a "unique role" is developed (14), and then "living" that role by entering "a 
lifelike state on stage". (35) Since The System is founded on universal laws, 
it is the "concrete technique by which an actor consciously transforms his 
psychological and physical behavior into those of the character." (14) Moore 
asserts that the "ultimate goal" and "final objective" of the actor is 
'"reincarnation'—the state in which he creates [a character] subconsciously" 
(15), "a state of . . . inspiration" (98). 
Regarding the actor's development of the physical side of characterization 
and acting, Moore merely pays lip-service to the primacy of the body in 
performance. She says she wants to redress "one of the gravest distortions of 
Stanislavski in the American theatre" by reasserting the important place of "the 
actor's physical training" in the Stanislvaski System. She states that "an actor's 
control over his body should be as complete as that of a dancer;" (16) however, 
the only idea of control which she articulates is that of the controlling mind. 
She claims that "the physical excellence that Stanislavski demands is intimately 
related to the psychological side of the technique," but does not articulate the 
precise nature of this "intimate relationship." (16) On the one hand she says 
that the ultimate goal of the System is "reincarnation" (15) and asserts that "the 
body must begin the action and it must finish it" (38); however, Moore 
provides no description of how "the body" accomplishes this. Rather, she 
assumes a Cartesian body-mind dualism and always iterates the supremacy of 
the mind, thinking, and therefore conscious control of the mind over the body, 
as when she concludes that the System permits the actor "consciously to 
control his entire apparatus of experiencing and incarnating." (34) From this 
statement it would appear that the actor's mind is an all-knowing entity 
controlling all experience and embodiment. But is this an accurate description 
of the bodymind relationship? Of the bodymind experience of the performer? 
The body along with "voice, speech, his powers of observation and 
imagination, his constant control over the 'feeling of truth,' his spiritual 
movement" are part of the "actor's apparatus." (35) Giving instructions Moore 
says, " . . . Let your body express what you have in your mind." [italics mine] 
(36) She tells students to take an image in mind, and then "make sure that 
your body expresses it." (37) She instructs people to "think, think and make 
your body project what is in your mind." [italics mine] (42) Here the mind is 
a container (of images, etc.) which are consciously transferable from the mind 
into the body. The mind-as-container is the place where the "emotions" are 
"stored" (65) to be re-lived in the act of performance. 
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Just as problematic is the notion of the psychological in Moore's 
paradigm of acting. Moore differentiates between what she calls "stage 
emotions" and "live true emotions," and tells how the performer develops these: 
through rehearsals, the actor develops a conditioned reflex in which 
his emotion is stirred through the stage stimulus. (65) 
To create the life-like character, the actor "re-lives" these "emotion stored in 
the actor's emotion memory." (65) By extending Moore's analogy, 
performance becomes a complex set of stimuli and responses. Like well-
trained canine counterparts, Moore's actors are able to perform repeated 
emotions.16 But unlike "live true emotions," these stage emotions do "not 
absorb the actor completely"--the actor "never forgets that he is performing on 
stage." (65) Somewhat uncomfortable with her own mechanistic language, 
Moore adds the caveat that these "repeated [stage] emotions" are "absolutely 
sincere." (65) 
Moore speaks as if science/technology and acting were analogous: 
To transform an actor's emotions into those of the character, 
according to scientists [which ones Moore does not say], is as 
complex as, for example, transforming the energy of Niagara Falls 
into the lights on Broadway or in this studio. It is the responsibility 
of technology to transform elemental forces of nature into useful 
work. And Stanislavski gives us a technology with the help of which 
an actor transforms his own emotions into those of the character he 
portrays. (33-34) 
She equates the elemental forces of nature with the actor's own emotions. In 
both cases technology is the means by which these raw, uncontrolled, wild 
forces are consciously controlled and transformed into something useful. In 
the case of Niagara Falls we get electricity for lights; in the case of the actor 
we get the emotions of the character. The System provides a supposedly sure-
fire means of control [stimulus-response] which brings order to disorder. 
Moore assumes a nature/culture dichotomy where culture (i.e., man) controls, 
shapes, and tames wild (female) nature. Once nature is controlled man uses 
it constructively (in a civilized manner) to make something else. 
What provides this control? How does the actor develop this control? 
What she variously calls "thinking," "logic," or "conscious control"-again, the 
Cartesian rational mind. For example, Moore tells her students: "We stop 
thinking in life only when we are unconscious or dead, and the character is 
dead when you stop thinking as the character." (81) But is thinking what the 
actor does in the act of performing the character and is that really the same 
as our typical mode of thinking in daily life? Moore is unclear in her use of 
thinking. What she calls "thinking as the character" is a complex set of 
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cognitive (and therefore psychophysical) processes of perceiving, imagining, 
remembering, etc., and not just one thing. 
Just as problematic is Moore's inadequate use of image and imagination. 
As Edward Casey eloquently points out, 
an inadequate descriptive basis leads to . . . the failure to distinguish 
imagination in any decisive way from other mental acts. This is a 
failure in proper identification-in other words, a matter of 
descriptive confusion. Such confusion . . . [is] present in the very way 
in which we use the word 'imagination* in ordinary language. To 
take three expressions from everyday speech: 
(1) My imagination was playing tricks on me when I mistook 
that tree over there for a man. 
(2) It was just my imagination when I thought I saw a red 
rat in my bedroom. 
(3) In my imagination I thought that he was out to get me.17 
Casey's conclusion regarding "these quotidian examples" equally applies to 
Moore's use of 'imagination': of these "quite different types of experience, 
none . . . can be considered a case of imagining proper." (10) 
Correcting a student, Moore says, 
You seem to be only trying to impress us with how well you read. 
But I want you to know why you say what you say and see the 
images [...] move your body logically to express your inner 
monologue and your images before you speak. (80-81) 
Moore's instruction to move the body logically is constructed from the point 
of view of the audience/outsider, and not from the point of view of the 
performer/agent. She wants the body's movements to appear to her as logical, 
Le., fitting the given dramatic circumstances of a scene in a realist drama. To 
the actor, these instructions give the impression of a cause-effect process in 
which mental images propel the inner monologue, logically expressed in the 
body movement, all of which propels the speech act as next in a hierarchical 
cause-effect order. But again, I ask, from the performer's point of view in the 
act of performance, can/does the body "logically express" anything? To use 
the word logical is to give the [especially inexperienced] actor the impression 
that this is a cerebral, self conscious way of embodying action. Ultimately, 
Moore's mind is the Cartesian ruling mind which imposes order on its world-
-the body and "live, true emotions." Moore's view reifies consciousness into an 
object "which has neither life nor history."18 For the reader, her narrative 
represents the performer as if s/he were divorced from the process of 
enactment, i.e., from the active corporeal engagement in the act of 
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performance. Her narrative makes the entire process appear conscious. 
However, as phenomenologist Calvin O. Schrag makes clear, consciousness is 
not a thing; rather "consciousness is always contextualized in the deployments 
of the lived body, and embodiment always provides the vicinity of 
consciousness."19 
What is so problematic about Moore's paradigm and makes it so 
potentially confusing for the inexperienced actor is the lack of a clear 
description of the relationship between preparation and performing, and of the 
act of performance itself. What does it mean to be "lifelike?" If the actor's 
optimum state is to be "lifelike," from whose point of view is this "lifelike" state 
constructed? Moore's "life-like" ideal is constructed from the point of view of 
the spectator at a realist drama. "Lifelikeness" is judged according to how well 
the actor is able to behave (psychologically) like characters conjured by the 
playtext. But from the performer's point of view qua performer, does 
embodying the psychophysical actions appear life-like? Or does being life-like 
better describe the embodied psychophysical experience of appearing life-like? 
Is not the actor in the act of performance living an experience? If so, this 
mode of experience or state of consciousness needs much clearer 
phenomenological description than it has had in the past, if it is not to be 
confused with the everyday. 
The implicit point of view most often assumed is that of the pedagogue, 
spectator, or director. Indeed, it is the "job" of the pedagogue-as-director in 
a realist drama to serve as the "audience's third eye." However, as Mark 
Weinberg pointed out in a personal communication. "Moore never 
differentiates between the 'is' of the performer and the 'appears to be' of the 
spectator." Many if not most of the commonplace instructions that directors 
give to actors in rehearsal assume, like most of Moore's coaching instructions, 
this outsider's point of view, such as "You're not concentrating on what you're 
doing." 
One thing we learn from other cultures is that their languages of the 
stage are not oriented to the outside, observer's point of view, but to the point 
of view of the cultural actor-the doer or performer. Therefore, the 
fundamental set of assumptions about the act of performance are founded on 
culturally specific notions of praxis/action. When there occasionally is a 
description of the performer's optimal condition, non-conditional state-of-being 
verbs are often used.20 When there is no overt description, the assumption is 
that the state is a non-conditional one.21 
The "like" of life-like points to one problem with the assumption of 
representation and mimesis as the primary category of Western theatrical 
realization-that there is some-thing to be re-presented; that there is a meaning 
to be transmitted: that there are characters in a script to be (mimetically) re-
created, etc. Moore reflects this fundamental view in her text on acting when 
she says, "Since each play presents a different world, each will have its own 
organic dramatic truth. The System is a means for finding it." (19) She 
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assumes that each play has a truth in it. The method of preparation becomes 
a treasure hunt for something findable. She reiterates the idea that there is 
one locatable meaning when she says "the director and the actors [ . . . must] 
understand the author's style and grasp the meaning as soon as possible." (24) 
She claims that the technique of analysis she presents in the book "brings the 
essence of the play to the surface . . . " (24) 
Mimesis assumes that there is an original thing (Plato's essences) to be 
copied. The primary concern of a representational way of reading a text and 
creating a character is with a systematic analysis of the text in order to "find" 
the character already "there," which is then carefully reconstructed, and then 
mimetically re-presented on the stage. The processual, phenomenal 
dimensions of the act of enactment are often neglected in discussions like 
Moore's. 
In Lakoff and Johnson's terms, this view of meaning assumed in 
representation and mimesis is part of the "myth of objectivism" which views the 
world as made up of objects which have "life" or properties independent of the 
people who make them or experience them; that "there is an objective reality, 
and we can say things that are objectively, absolutely, and unconditionally true 
and false about it [ . . . ]," that "words have fixed meanings [ . . . ];" that "people 
can be objective and can speak objectively [ . . . ]:" and that "to be objective is 
to be rational [ . . . J."22 It is a discourse which reveals a metaphysics which is 
objectivist since it postulates, like model-theoretic semantics, "a structure of 
reality that is independent of the way any beings, human or otherwise, come 
to experience and understand that reality."23 Its semantics are objectivist since 
its account of meaning is "independent of any beings, their nature, or their 
experiences" (ibid). 
Even though creating a role is presumably an activity in which the actor 
must be experientially involved, as we have seen the rhetoric and semantics 
used by authors like Moore to represent its creation gives the impression that 
it is an object logically constructed by the mind to be put into the body. The 
notion of character is a "model-structure" which becomes represented as 
logically constructed by the mind. There is a lack of descriptive detail 
regarding precisely how the human being comes to understand this model-
structure, and how a relation-in-meaning is created to this "character" so 
constructed. There is woefully inadequate detail regarding the mental 
processes by means of which the character is understood. Rather, attention is 
focused primarily on the logical/cognitive decisions one makes while creating 
the character, rather than on the phenomenon and process of coming to 
actually embody, actualize, and thereby "know" the character. When 
represented as a conscious set of logical, mental decisions, the active 
engagement of the cultural actor (or subject) in the process of creating the 
character is misplaced, lost, dropped out of view. 
The presence of objectivist assumptions demonstrates the power of these 
fundamental metaphysical assumptions even in an activity which must be 
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embodied and actualized processually. Following Johnson, I argue that even 
in the case of acting selected "objectivist themes constitute a background 
against which [its] main" theories have been elaborated in the modern period 
(xxxv). 
Moore locates the creativity of the cultural actor on the stage where the 
actor achieves his "final objective" and "ultimate goal: 'reincarnation,'"--a state 
in which the actor "creates subconsciously." (15) However, the only description 
Moore musters of this ideal state of subconscious creativity is to call it 
"inspiration." (98) All of the "conscious work is the means which prepares the 
most favorable grounds for possible inspiration." (98) Here Moore places the 
performer squarely within the Romantic arms of the muse of creativity, i.e., the 
subjectivist notion of the lonely artistic genius receiving inspiration. But Moore 
doesn't trust the subjective side, and asserts that "even the greatest talent will 
gradually fade without technique to control it." (99) 
Moore's emphasis on conscious control is in part a reaction against the 
traditional romantic, subjectivist notion of "experience" (the presence of the 
poetic "muse") assumed by some actors to lie behind what they do. But does 
Moore really escape subjectivism as she embraces objectivism? Not really, 
since she never is able to clearly articulate the nature of the experience about 
which she is attempting to write. The deeper problem, as pointed out 
throughout this essay, is with the fundamental categories she uses to discuss 
acting in the first place which assume the myths of both objectivism and 
subjectivism. 
Moore's use of the word, "experience" is also problematic. She says that 
the actor who actualizes the technique of the System will "live the experiences 
of the character and 'incarnate' him." (19) Although Moore appears to be 
concerned with the actor's experience, we have seen how she is actually more 
concerned with describing how to self-consciously construct a map of a 
character's experience from a playtext-with building a set of psychologically 
"logical" behaviors. Only secondarily is she concerned with the phenomenon 
of "living," i.e., performing/doing those behaviors. When it comes to the 
qualitative, phenomenal domain of performance per se, her terminology 
remains a loose collection of rather ambiguous generalities: the actor "relives 
the emotion," "believes", and "thinks." But how (in descriptive terms), and 
what that experience is like, never quite becomes clear. Moore renders and 
represents experience [and performance] as an entity, altogether missing the 
embodied nature of the act of performance. As Schrag puts it, 
The body as an experienced phenomenon is primordially presented 
not as a representable object but in the immediacy of its lived 
concreteness. The experienced body is not an object for the 
abstractive gaze: it is the body as lived, as lodged in the world as a 
base of operations from which attitudes are assumed and projects 
deployed. The body as object, which has its limited natural 
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justification in the anatomical and physiological sciences, is the body 
excerpted from its living involvements and quoted out of context. 
(130) 
Behind Moore's lack of any clear description of the nature of experience is the 
tension of her implicit dualism-the assumption of an all-controlling Cartesian 
mind at war with potentially uncontrollable feelings, emotions, etc. 
What are the larger implications of this particular rereading of Moore's 
text? First, this and re-readings of other acting texts may help us recognize the 
constructed nature of what we assume when we think and talk about acting. 
Second, by carefully rereading this and other texts we can begin to see how 
our thinking has been conceptually and culturally bound by particular 
paradigms in the past. Third, perhaps we can begin to construct better, more 
helpful paradigms focusing on the phenomenon of performance, more clearly 
articulating the relationship between preparation of a role and its enactment, 
and more sensitive to the performer's point of view. Perhaps we can rethink 
our own thinking and talking about performance by looking more closely at 
other cultures' assumptions about the body, bodymind, experience, and 
emotions-the "stuff out of which performance, from the performer's point of 
view, is created. 
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